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This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer side market transparency with
endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique sym-
metric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market
transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market structure effect. We
show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market structure
effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes in-
creasingly transparent. Consumer side market transparency can therefore be socially
excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand
functions is the set of constant demand functions. (JEL: D43; L13; L15)
1 Introduction
Absent concerns of collusion, market transparency is widely considered a good thing.
Defined as the share of consumers who are perfectly informed about all available prices,
market transparency is thought to intensify price competition among firms, and hence to
improve consumer and social welfare in a given market. Moreover, several recent studies
unanimously confirmed beneficial effects of market transparency even when firms’ entry
decisions are included. In this paper, we present a cautionary tale that shows consumer
side market transparency can be excessive for both consumer and social welfare under
surprisingly general demand conditions on the one hand and a particular mode of firm
entry on the other. It is well known that more intense competition in a market (e.g.
more firms or price rather than quantity competition) reduces the incentives to enter
this market in the first place and that, in consequence, the overall effect of increased
competition on social welfare can be negative. However, the recent literature on market
transparency does not find such an effect.
∗Yiquan Gu (corresponding author), University of Liverpool; Burkhard Hehenkamp, Uni-
versity of Paderborn. We are grateful to Christoph Schmidt for suggesting the title and to
Anthony Creane for very helpful discussions. We thank Biung-Ghi Ju and an anonymous ref-
eree for valuable suggestions which greatly improved the paper, and participants of the 2011
RES Conference at Royal Holloway, the 9th IIOC in Boston, and the 2011 SIOMS in Chengdu
as well as seminar audiences at the Universities of Dortmund, Duisburg-Essen, Heidelberg,
Liverpool, Reading and Toulouse School of Economics for helpful comments.
2Market transparency in general encompasses all informational aspects of a market. It
refers to how well informed market participants are regarding price, quality, availability
and/or other characteristics of a product or service. Markets usually display varying
degrees of transparency due to costs in transmitting and obtaining information such as
search costs of consumers (Diamond, 1971; Stahl, 1989; Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou,
2009), and possibly also to strategic obfuscation of firms (Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Car-
lin, 2009). Besides, market transparency has long been a key issue in economic policy,
especially since the introduction of the European common market. Notably, measures
to improve market transparency formed a central cornerstone in the 1990s when gov-
ernments started market liberalization in industries such as mail, telecommunication,
electricity, gas, etc. In the same decade the advent of the Internet provided increasingly
more consumers with simple and cheap ways to learn and compare prices.1 In conse-
quence, one sees the rise of price-related market transparency in many retail markets.
The welfare effects of market transparency are an important topic to be studied and
understood. The prevailing view in the literature can be summarized as follows. If firm
collusion is at debate, then the overall welfare effect of market transparency is ambiguous.
Increased transparency on the firm side increases the scope for coordinated behaviour of
firms, and hence is normally considered anti-competitive and welfare damaging (see, e.g.,
Albaek, Møllgaard, and Overgaard, 1997; Møllgaard and Overgaard, 2001). Increased
transparency on the consumer side, on the other hand, allows consumers to make bet-
ter choices and therefore promotes firm competition and market efficiency in a static
setting. However, if firms interact repeatedly and collusion is a concern, consumer side
market transparency may either increase or decrease the scope for collusion as it alters
both the short-term gain and the long-term punishment to a deviation. (An increase
in consumer side market transparency increases a firm’s incentive in deviating from a
collusion as more consumers will respond to an undercutting price. This effect desta-
bilises a collusion. However, an increase in transparency also increases the magnitude
of punishment to a deviant as firm profits under competition are lower in a more trans-
parent market. This effect helps to sustain a collusion. The overall effect is ambiguous.
While in Schultz (2005), consumer side market transparency makes a tacit collusion
more difficult, Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001) find it can also make a collusion easier.)
However, when firm collusion is not a concern, market transparency is found to
be unambiguously welfare improving in the literature. In other words, the gain through
transparency induced fiercer price competition dominates any potential source of welfare
loss. Schultz (2004) studies market transparency in a Hotelling (1929) market with unit
consumer demand and quadratic transportation cost. Although with more consumers
becoming informed, firms would like to stay further away from each other to soften
competition, their incentive to move closer to the competitor to increase market share
1It is understood from the endogenous search literature that an increase in the share of
consumers with negligible search costs increases the measure of transparency as defined in
this paper. See, for example, Stahl (1989) in which consumers with zero search cost become
informed of all prices while consumers with high search costs do not search at all. See also the
moderate search intensity equilibrium in Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004).
3dominates. It turns out that market transparency leads to less differentiated products as
well as lower prices. In consequence, consumer surplus increases, firm profit decreases,
and overall social welfare increases in Schultz (2004).
More closely related to the current paper are the findings in Schultz (2009) and
Gu and Wenzel (2011). Both papers build upon the Salop (1979) model of product
differentiation with endogenous, long run free entry. Market transparency in such a
setting reduces firm profits in the pricing stage for a given number firms. As a result,
the number of active firms in the long run is lower in a more transparent market. Due to
consumers’ preference for variety, a reduction in the number of firms could potentially
reduce consumer- as well as social-welfare. However, the efficiency gain from price
competition dominates the loss from less variety, and the overall effect of transparency is
unambiguously positive. This result is established by Schultz (2009) with unit demand
and further confirmed in Gu and Wenzel (2011), where consumer demand exhibits a
constant price elasticity following Gu and Wenzel (2009). Price dependent demand in
spatial models is studied more generally in Gu and Wenzel (2012a).
Additionally, when firms differ in their marginal costs of production, Gu and Wenzel
(2012b) argue that market transparency further selects more productive entrants at the
entry stage, and thus presents yet another source of efficiency improvement. Boone and
Potters (2006) investigate a different type of market transparency defined as the share
of consumers who are aware of all available varieties of a differentiated product. With
firms competing in quantities, the authors show that under certain conditions consumer
surplus may fall as market transparency rises. However, it still holds that social welfare
always increases in market transparency.2
In this paper we show that i) market transparency can be socially excessive even
without collusion, ii) previous results under endogenous entry depend critically on the
mode of market entry, iii) and constant (or unit) demand functions lead to qualitatively
different welfare results compared to price-dependent demand schedules. Indeed, when
potential entrants enter the market simultaneously, in the unique symmetric equilibrium
(which is in mixed strategies), both social welfare and consumer welfare eventually de-
crease as market transparency rises, for almost all demand functions. The only exception
is the class of constant demand functions for which market transparency unambiguously
improves welfare.
To derive these results, we develop a simple two-stage model where, at stage 1,
potential entrants simultaneously decide whether or not to enter a homogeneous product
market by paying a fixed cost of entry and where, at stage 2, actual entrants compete
in prices. Following Varian (1980) and Schultz (2009), only a fraction of the consumers
2Hviid and Møllgaard (2006) study transparency in an intermediate goods market where
transaction terms are negotiated between one upstream seller and two independent, differen-
tially informed, downstream buyers. Improved transparency prompts the ill-informed buyer
to take a tougher bargaining stand but it may also lead the seller to do the same with the
informed buyer. Welfare effects of improved transparency are thus found ambiguous. The
current paper differs substantially from theirs in that we focus on supply side competition and
market entry.
4is informed about prices of all actual entrants. The rest is uninformed and randomly
buys from each of the available firms with identical probability. The share of informed
consumers is our measure of market transparency. When the market becomes more
transparent, active firms compete more aggressively in the second stage and profits are
reduced. As a consequence, entry becomes less attractive and the symmetric equilibrium
entry probability of potential entrants decreases.
We note that for markets with long development times (e.g. due to R&D investments)
or markets where newly and unexpected business opportunities have sprung up (like the
Eastern European markets when unexpectedly the Berlin wall came down), potential
entrants have to make decisions without knowing others’ choices, and therefore the
simultaneous entry model and its unique symmetric equilibrium are particularly relevant.
Compared to an asymmetric equilibrium, considering a symmetric entry equilibrium
has the following additional advantages. First, given that we study the symmetric pricing
equilibrium at the second stage, conceptually it is natural to study the symmetric entry
equilibrium at the first stage too. After all, it is not clear why a potential entrant’s
equilibrium strategy should be different from that of another. Second, there are cases
where firms enter a market but fail to repay their entry costs and cases where no firm
enters a profitable market.3 One would argue that a mixed strategy entry equilibrium
can explain such observations much better than a pure strategy equilibrium. Finally, a
symmetric entry equilibrium also allows us to avoid the integer problem associated with
an asymmetric equilibrium. For a more detailed discussion on pure vs. mixed strategies
of market entry, see Dixit and Shapiro (1986).
In terms of welfare, we identify two effects of market transparency. Firstly, for
any second stage oligopoly, market transparency drives product price closer to the
marginal cost of production, and hence increases market efficiency for a given number
of oligopolists. This direct competition effect of market transparency is positive. Sec-
ondly, market transparency decreases the entry probability of potential entrants which
in turn increases the probability of a “market breakdown” and decreases the probability
of having an oligopoly. This previously overlooked, indirect market structure effect of
market transparency is negative for almost all demand functions. Unlike the indirect
welfare effect resulting from less variety in Schultz (2009) and in Gu and Wenzel (2011),
the negative market structure effect almost always dominates the positive competition
effect when the market becomes sufficiently transparent. The only exception are the
cases where compared to a monopoly there is i) neither any consumer welfare loss in a
market breakdown ii) nor any social welfare benefit in having an oligopoly. The former
mutes the impact of not having a market at all and the latter the impact of a lower prob-
3For instance, in the movie market, there have been many films that have made huge
financial losses possibly due to too many competing titles in the same genre with close release
dates. An example would be the 1946 classic It’s a Wonderful Life which, according to Jewell
and Harbin (1982), recorded a loss of $525,000 at the box office. One of the reasons for the loss
might have been tough competition from films like The Best Years of Our Lives and Miracle
on 34th Street. On the other hand, however, we sometimes also see no new movies being offered
in a certain genre in a certain period of time.
5ability of having price competition. Among those demand schedules commonly used in
the literature, only the class of constant demand functions gives rise to a universally
positive effect of market transparency when entry strategies are symmetric.
Our findings can be viewed in the following perspectives. Firstly, they provide a
cautionary tale about potential negative welfare consequences of market transparency
even when collusion is impossible. While many studies assume market existence and
firm competition as given, we show that the novel market structure effect of market
transparency resulting from mixed strategies of entry deserves its due attention. Extra
caution is needed when giving transparency-related policy recommendations.
Secondly, we relate our result to the more traditional debate on dynamic efficiency
of market competition. It is well understood that more intense competition need not be
welfare improving when dynamic aspects such as innovation, market entry/exit, etc. are
considered. For instance, in a standard homogeneous product market a switch from
Cournot to Bertrand competition may reduce welfare when firms have to cover their
entry costs. In our model, market competition becomes more intense as transparency
rises and converges to standard Bertrand competition in the limit of full transparency.
We examine the relationship between market transparency and its dynamic efficiency
in the neighbourhood of full transparency where entry is smoothly affected by market
competition. Our main result shows that more market transparency can harm social
welfare which is in line with findings from the dynamic efficiency literature but surprising
to the transparency literature.
Thirdly, it should be duly noted that our result, because of its generality, is a limit
result in nature. It says when a market approaches to full transparency, the marginal
impact of market transparency on social welfare is negative. As our example in Section
5.4 suggests, the exact optimal level of market transparency varies with different model
parameters. There is no doubt that better information among consumers improves the
functioning of non-transparent markets.
Last but not least, it is worth noting that our finding complements the recent overhaul
of traditional results led by Etro (2006, 2008, 2011a,b) which takes into account that
market structures are usually endogenously determined.4 We show that the market
structure effect of market transparency leads to surprising results that are absent in an
exogenous market structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section
3, we identify equilibrium pricing strategies at stage 2 and introduce the competition
effect of market transparency. Firms’ equilibrium entry strategies and the market struc-
ture effect of market transparency are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we carry out
the analysis of ex ante social welfare, deliver our main theorem, and discuss exceptional
cases and optimal transparency. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6 and the
proof of the theorem appears in the Appendix.
4The authors thank Anthony Creane for pointing out this connection.
62 The model
2.1 Market transparency and consumer demand
We consider a homogeneous product market with endogenous entry. On the demand
side, there is a measure 1 of consumers. Following Varian (1980), a share φ ∈ [0, 1] of
them is informed, i.e., they know all prices quoted in the market. The rest is uninformed.
The share of informed consumers, φ, is our measure of market transparency and assumed
common knowledge.
Informed consumers buy from the firm that charges the lowest price. If there are
several, these firms share the demand evenly. Uninformed consumers, on the other hand,
cannot compare prices and randomly buy from each of the available firms with identical
probability.5 Therefore, in expectation, all available firms receive an equal share of
uninformed consumers.
Individual demand is identical across all consumers which is given by a measurable
and integrable function D(p), mapping non-negative prices p ∈ [0,∞) into non-negative
demand D ∈ [0,∞). We assume that the associated revenue function, R(p) := p ·
D(p), attains a unique global maximum, Rm := R(pm) > 0, at some price pm > 0.
Furthermore, D(p) is assumed non-increasing and continuous on [0, pm].
Central to our welfare analysis is consumer surplus,
CS(p) :=
∫ ∞
p
D(p˜)dp˜.
We note that CS(p) is well defined and finite for any price p ∈ [0,∞) as D(p) is assumed
measurable and integrable. Moreover, CS(p) is continuously differentiable on [0, pm] by
the continuity of D(p) on [0, pm].
2.2 The market game
The market game consists of two stages. At stage 1, N ≥ 2 identical firms, or potential
entrants, simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to enter the market.
Entry costs f > 0. In a slight abuse of notation, let N := {1, . . . , N} denote the
corresponding set of potential entrants. At stage 2, entry costs are sunk. Knowing
the firms that have entered at stage 1, actual entrants compete in prices for informed
consumers. Let K := {1, . . . , K} denote the corresponding set of actual entrants (after
appropriate relabelling). Then, each entrant i ∈ K chooses a non-negative price pi ∈
P := [0,∞). We assume that all firms have an identical constant marginal cost of
production which is normalized to zero, and that all firms are profit maximizers. Then,
pm is the price a monopolist would charge.
Entry cost f satisfies:
(1)
Rm
N
< f < Rm.
5For an analysis of Bertrand preferences of this type, see, e.g., Hehenkamp (2002).
7The first inequality reflects that not all firms can profitably enter the market at the same
time, even if they all set the monopoly price. The second inequality ensures that one
firm alone would always find it profitable to supply the market. We note, however, that
for a given level of market transparency φ ∈ [0, 1], our equilibrium results require only
that f ∈ ((1− φ)Rm/N,Rm), which is weaker than (1), especially when φ is large.6 For
our limit welfare result to hold, f ∈ (0, Rm) suffices. Condition (1) is imposed to rule out
trivial outcomes, and is made conservative to facilitate a smooth change in equilibrium
outcome when market transparency alters.
3 Equilibrium analysis: stage 2 pricing behaviour
Given the symmetric nature of the model, we seek for a symmetric equilibrium. Accord-
ing to the assumption on the fixed cost of entry f , at the first stage of market entry
a symmetric equilibrium must be in mixed strategies. Using backward induction, in
this section we first analyse stage 2 subgames. Also in this section, we introduce the
competition effect of market transparency.
Three qualitatively different market structures can emerge at stage 2, depending
on the number of actual entrants, K. First, there can be no actual entrant and the
market does not come into existence. Second, one firm has entered and this firm enjoys
a monopoly position. Third, two or more firms have entered and the market forms an
oligopoly.
3.1 Market breakdown and monopoly
When no firm enters, i.e., K = 0, the market breaks down, and consumer surplus is
zero. For consumers, this is the worst case. When K = 1, the monopolist charges
the monopoly price pm, realizing a revenue of Rm. That all consumers buy from the
monopolist at pm leads to a relatively low consumer surplus CSm := CS(pm). The
market outcomes in these two cases do not directly depend on market transparency φ.
3.2 Oligopoly
When 2 ≤ K ≤ N firms have entered the market at stage 1, they compete in prices
for informed consumers at stage 2. Since the entrants charging the lowest price share
the demand of informed consumers evenly, and since all entrants share the demand of
uninformed consumers equally, the revenue function of entrant i ∈ K is given by
Ri(p1, . . . , pK) =
{
1−φ
K
R(pi) if pi > min{p1, . . . , pK}(
1−φ
K
+ φ
#I(p)
)
R(pi) if pi = min{p1, . . . , pK}
,
6We will see later in Proposition 2 that an entrant receives a revenue of (1− φ)Rm/K at
the second stage after 2 ≤ K ≤ N firms have entered. Therefore, when f > (1− φ)Rm/N , not
all N firms can profitably enter the market.
8where #I(p) is the number of firms who tie at the lowest price for a given price profile
p = (p1, . . . , pK).
We now further distinguish three scenarios according to the level of market trans-
parency. Firstly, when all consumers are uninformed (φ = 0), effectively there is no
competition among the K entrants. Each of them receives a share of 1/K consumers
and charges pm to obtain a revenue of Rm/K. Consumer surplus corresponds to that of
the monopoly case, CSKφ=0 = CS(p
m), where for CS the superscript K represents the
number of actual entrants and the subscript indicates the level of market transparency.
Secondly, when all consumers are perfectly informed (φ = 1), the pricing game
reduces to a standard Bertrand oligopoly. In any equilibrium, at least two firms price at
the marginal cost of production, and all consumers buy at this price. Therefore, all K
entrants earn zero revenue, and consumer surplus is at its maximum, CSKφ=1 = CS(0).
Finally, when φ ∈ (0, 1), there exists no pricing equilibrium in pure strategies.
Lemma If 2 ≤ K ≤ N and φ ∈ (0, 1), there exists no stage 2 pricing equilibrium in
pure strategies.
This is a standard result in models with intermediate levels of market transparency.7
See, for example, Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980). The intuition is the following.
Like in a standard Bertrand model, firms have an incentive to undercut each other.
Unlike in a Bertrand model, however, pricing at marginal cost is strictly dominated by
charging the monopoly price and receiving monopoly revenue from one’s own share of
uninformed consumers. As a result, there exists no pure strategy pricing equilibrium.
Nevertheless, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium which is in mixed strate-
gies. In this equilibrium all K actual entrants adopt a common cumulative distribution
function (cdf) HK(p) := Pr{P ≤ p}.
Proposition 1 (Rosenthal, 1980) Suppose there are 2 ≤ K ≤ N firms in the
market at stage 2 and market transparency is intermediate, φ ∈ (0, 1). Let pK be defined
by
(2) pK := inf
{
p ∈ [0, pm] :
(
1− φ
K
+ φ
)
R(p) =
1− φ
K
Rm
}
,
and let
(3) HK(p) :=

0 for p < p
1− inf
p≤p′≤p
(
1−φ
Kφ
Rm−R(p′)
R(p′)
) 1
K−1
for p ≤ p ≤ pm
1 for p > pm
.
Then the strategy profile (HK , . . . , HK) represents the unique symmetric Nash equilib-
rium of the K-firm oligopoly pricing game at stage 2.
7Omitted standard proofs are available from the authors upon request.
9We note first that this result follows directly from Rosenthal (1980) if we let Rosen-
thal’s captive market demand of each firm be ((1− φ)/K)D(p) and the common market
demand be φD(p).8 The intuition for this result is that a firm can always guarantee itself
at least a revenue of ((1− φ)/K)Rm by charging the monopoly price pm and giving up
on competing for informed consumers. In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
the expected revenue at any price in the support should be the same as ((1− φ)/K)Rm.
In particular, this condition pins down the lower bound of the support at which a firm
receives both its own share of uninformed consumers and all informed consumers.
Second, this symmetric mixed equilibrium strategy, HK(p), converges in probability
to marginal cost pricing when the market approaches full transparency (φ→ 1−), and to
monopoly price pricing when the market approaches no transparency at all (φ→ 0+).9
Hence, our model behaves smoothly at the boundaries of full and no transparency,
respectively.
Third, in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium each actual entrant earns an
expected revenue of ((1− φ)/K)Rm. The rent from informed consumers is completely
competed away. On the demand side, each uninformed consumer buys at a price drawn
from the distribution given by the firms’ symmetric pricing strategy. Informed con-
sumers, on the other hand, can compared the K realized prices and pick the lowest.
Therefore, an informed consumer buys at the minimum price of all entrants which is the
first order statistic of K random variables independently chosen from the distribution
HK . The following proposition summarises.
Proposition 2 Suppose 2 ≤ K ≤ N and φ ∈ (0, 1). Then in the second stage K-firm
oligopoly,
(i) an actual entrant’s expected revenue is ((1− φ)/K)Rm and
(ii) the expected consumer surplus is
(4) CSKφ = φ
∫ pm
pK
CS(p)dHK(1)(p) + (1− φ)
∫ pm
pK
CS(p)dH(p),
where HK(1)(p) denotes the cdf of first order statistic of the K independently dis-
tributed prices.
3.3 Competition effect of market transparency
We end our analysis of stage 2 by highlighting the competition effect of market trans-
parency. For a given oligopoly, market transparency makes price competition more
intensive and indeed “lowers” equilibrium prices, in terms of first order stochastic dom-
inance. Consequently, the expected consumer surplus increases as the market becomes
8Note, however, that when the degree of market transparency changes, the relative size of
the captive and the common market does so too.
9Weak convergence can be easily shown, using the equilibrium strategy derived in Proposi-
tion 1. Convergence in probability is implied because the limit distribution has all probability
on a single price (i.e., because the corresponding limit random variable is a constant).
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more transparent in a given oligopoly. This is the competition effect of market trans-
parency.
Proposition 3 Suppose 2 ≤ K ≤ N and φ ∈ (0, 1). The more transparent the market
(the higher φ), the lower an entrant’s price, the lower the minimum price of all entrants
(both in terms of first order stochastic dominance), and the higher the expected consumer
surplus, CSKφ .
Proof First, the complementary probability ĤK(p) := 1 − HK(p), considered as
function of φ, clearly decreases in φ. Hence, a pricing strategy HK(p) corresponding
to a lower market transparency φ′ first order stochastically dominates another that
corresponds to some larger degree of market transparency φ′′, for any 0 < φ′ < φ′′ < 1.
Second, the distribution of the first order stochastic, HK(1)(p), inherits all stochastic
monotonicity properties from its parent distribution, HK(p) (see David and Nagaraja,
2003, Theorem 4.4.1).
Finally, consumer surplus CS(p) is a bounded, continuous, and strictly decreasing
function of p on the interval [0, pm]. The final claim hence follows from Theorem 1.A.3
in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). Q.E.D.
4 Equilibrium analysis: stage 1 entry decisions
Having analysed the equilibrium behaviour at stage 2, we now proceed to investigate
the entry decision of a potential entrant at stage 1. Again, we confine our analysis to
symmetric equilibria. Given the results in Proposition 2, we note that the characteriza-
tion of the mixed strategy entry equilibrium is relatively straightforward. Later in this
section, we detail the market structure effect of market transparency.
4.1 Symmetric entry equilibrium
First, note that there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.10 Second, we show
that the unique symmetric entry equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Let ε ∈ (0, 1) denote the symmetric probability of entry. In equilibrium, each firm
must be indifferent between ‘entry’ and ‘no entry’. Since ‘no entry’ entails an expected
payoff of zero, ‘entry’ does so too:
(1− ε)N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of a monopoly
Rm +
N−1∑
j=1
(
N − 1
j
)
εj (1− ε)N−1−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of a (j+1)-oligopoly
(1− φ)Rm
j + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(j+1)-oligopoly revenue
10Recall that f ∈ (Rm/N,Rm). If all firms enter, they incur losses because (1− φ)Rm/N ≤
Rm/N < f . Hence, for any firm, ’no entry’ would be strictly better than ’entry’ (given that
all other firms stick with ’entry’). If no firm enters, entry is profitable because Rm > f (given
that all other firms stay out of the market).
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− f︸︷︷︸
Entry cost
= 0︸︷︷︸
Payoff of ‘no entry’
.(5)
The first two items in (5) represent the expected revenue of entry. Given that the
other (N − 1) firms enter the market independently with probability ε, by entry a firm
enjoys the monopoly position and earns the monopoly revenue Rm with the probability
of (1− ε)N−1. With the probability of (N−1
j
)
εj (1− ε)N−1−j, j other firms enter and the
market becomes a (j + 1)-oligopoly. In such a case, ‘entry’ yields an expected revenue
of (1− φ)Rm/(j + 1) (see Proposition 2). The overall expected revenue of ‘entry’ net of
entry cost f should be equal to the payoff of ‘no entry’ which is zero.
It’s easily verified that when an ε ∈ (0, 1) satisfies equation (5), it identifies a sym-
metric entry equilibrium at stage 1. Indeed, we have the following result where (6) is a
simplified version of (5).
Proposition 4 For any degree of market transparency φ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium at stage 1, which is in mixed strategies. The corresponding prob-
ability of entry, ε, is implicitly given by
(6) φ (1− ε)N−1 + 1− φ
Nε
[
1− (1− ε)N] = f
Rm
.
Proof We first show that (6) can be derived from (5). We then show that, for any
φ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique ε ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies (6). The rest follows straight-
forwardly from the characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium (see, e.g., Osborne,
2009, chap. 4).
We note the following two identities:
N−1∑
j=1
(
N − 1
j
)
εj (1− ε)N−1−j
j + 1
=
1
Nε
N∑
j=2
(
N
j
)
εj (1− ε)N−j and
1 = [ε+ (1− ε)]N =
N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
εj(1− ε)N−j.
Using these two identities, condition (5) can be simplified to
(1− ε)N−1 + (1− φ) 1− (1− ε)
N −Nε (1− ε)N−1
Nε
=
f
Rm
,
and further easily to (6).
Fix a φ ∈ [0, 1] and let V denote the left-hand side of (6). To establish the existence of
a unique ε ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies (6), we note first that V is a continuous and differentiable
function of ε. Second,11
(7)
dV
dε
= −φ(N − 1)(1− ε)N−2 − (1− φ)1−Nε(1− ε)
N−1 − (1− ε)N
Nε2
< 0.
11Note that 1 =
∑N
j=0
(
N
j
)
εj(1− ε)N−j > Nε(1− ε)N−1 + (1− ε)N .
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Third, V approaches 1 as ε→ 0 and approaches (1− φ)/N as ε→ 1. And finally, from
condition (1) on the entry cost, we have
1− φ
N
≤ 1
N
<
f
Rm
< 1.
By the intermediate value theorem, there hence exists a unique ε ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
(6). Q.E.D.
4.2 Market structure effect of market transparency
Intuitively, when the market becomes less profitable, firms have a smaller incentive to
enter, and therefore the equilibrium entry probability ε should decrease. In the current
framework, the market can become less profitable for two reasons: a higher level of
market transparency and a higher entry cost per unit of monopoly revenue.
Proposition 5 Entry is the less likely (the smaller ε),
(i) the more transparent the market (the larger φ), and/or
(ii) the higher the ratio of entry cost and monopoly revenue (the larger f/Rm).
Proof From (7) in the previous proof we know dV/dε < 0. Therefore, claim ii) follows.
Moreover,
(8)
dV
dφ
= −1−Nε(1− ε)
N−1 − (1− ε)N
Nε
< 0.
By the implicit function theorem, we have dV/dε < 0 and hence, claim i) follows. Q.E.D.
Central to our welfare analysis is the impact of market transparency on the equilib-
rium probability of entry. When a market becomes more transparent, price competition
becomes more intensive and consequently, the equilibrium entry probability decreases. A
lower entry probability in turn has two effects: i) the probability of market non-existence,
(1−ε)N , increases ; ii) the probability of having an oligopoly, 1−(1−ε)N−Nε(1−ε)N−1,
decreases.12 This is what we call the market structure effect of market transparency. To
summarise:
Proposition 6 The more transparent the market, the more likely there is no ex post
entry, and the less likely there is ex post price competition.
12Note that
d
(
1− (1− ε)N −Nε(1− ε)N−1)
dε
= N(N − 1)ε(1− ε)N−2 > 0.
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5 Social welfare
In this section we present our main result: for almost all demand functions, social welfare
eventually decreases in market transparency. In this sense, market transparency can
indeed be excessive, and full transparency is almost always suboptimal. As the proof
of the main result is rather complicated, it appears in the Appendix and we instead
focus on the underlying intuition in this section. We will also discuss the special case of
constant demand functions and the socially optimal level of market transparency.
5.1 Social welfare and market transparency
Social welfare consists of two parts: firm profits and consumer surplus. However, in
expectation, all N potential entrants earn zero profits. Therefore, expected social welfare
and expected consumer surplus coincide. Ex ante, there are three different market
structures at stage 2: market breakdown, monopoly, and oligopoly. Consumer surplus
is zero when no firm has entered at stage 2, CSm in a monopoly, and CSKφ in a K-firm
oligopoly. Letting W denote the ex ante expected social welfare, we have
(9) W = (1− ε)N︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of no entry
0 + Nε (1− ε)N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of a monopoly
CSm +
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
εK (1− ε)N−K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of a K-oligopoly
CSKφ ,
where CSKφ is defined in equation (4).
From (9), we can clearly see the two effects of market transparency φ on social wel-
fare. First, in a given oligopoly, the positive competition effect of market transparency
increases consumer surplus CSKφ (see Proposition 3). Second, through a lower equi-
librium entry probability, the market structure effect of market transparency increases
the probability of market breakdown and reduces the probability of an oligopoly (see
Proposition 6). As CSKφ ≥ CSm ≥ 0, this market structure effect is usually negative. In
general, the overall effect of market transparency can be in either direction depending
on which effect dominates the other. However, it can be shown that in the limit as
φ approaches 1, for almost all demand functions, the negative market structure effect
dominates the positive competition effect.
5.2 Too much of a good thing
To make the point precise, our objective here is to show that limφ→1− dW/dφ < 0. To
this end, we make the following simplifying assumption on the demand function D(p).
Assumption (D) Demand D(p) is differentiable on (0, pm], and satisfies R′(p) =
D(p) + pD′(p) > 0 on (0, pm) and limp→0+ pD′(p) = 0.
Regarding this assumption, several remarks are in order. First, the differentiability of
D(p) is needed only for the differentiability of social welfare W ; it is not needed through-
out our equilibrium analysis. Second, that R′(p) is strictly larger than zero ensures the
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differentiability of the second stage pricing equilibrium HK(p) which is required for the
differentiability of social welfare.13 Third, limp→0+ pD′(p) = 0 is a very mild assump-
tion. It would have been natural to impose the more demanding requirement that the
resulting increase in demand is bounded as price approaches marginal cost. However,
we can do better and allow for limp→0+ D′(p) = −∞ as long as p converges to 0 faster
than D′(p) goes to −∞.
Theorem Let Assumption (D) be met. Social welfare W decreases with market trans-
parency φ for φ sufficiently large, i.e., limφ→1− dW/dφ < 0, if either of the following two
conditions holds (or both):
i) CSm > 0; ii) CS(0)− CSm −Rm > 0.
This theorem identifies two conditions on the demand function each as sufficient for
market transparency to unambiguously decrease social welfare when φ approaches 1. The
first condition requires the consumer surplus at the monopoly price, CSm =
∫∞
pm
D(p˜)dp˜,
to be strictly larger than zero. The second condition says that the deadweight loss
associated with a monopoly relative to perfect competition, CS(0) − CSm − Rm =∫ pm
0
[D(p˜)−D(pm)] dp˜, is strictly positive.
The intuition of this result is as follows. The market structure effect of market trans-
parency is detrimental to social welfare because it increases the probability of market
non-existence and decreases the probability of an oligopoly. If there is neither any con-
sumer welfare loss in a market breakdown (CSm = 0) nor any social welfare benefit in
having price competition (CS(0) = CSm +Rm), changes in the probabilities of different
market structures naturally become benign to social welfare.
Both conditions could easily be replaced by direct requirements on the primitive
demand function. For instance, condition i) would be implied if D(p) were assumed con-
tinuous at pm from both sides and condition ii) would follow if D(p) were assumed strictly
decreasing at some price p ∈ (0, pm). However, we think our current characterization of
the two conditions is more intuitive.
It is also evident from this discussion that for almost all demand functions, at least
one of the two conditions holds. Therefore, our finding that market transparency be-
comes socially excessive when market is sufficiently transparent is robust.
A detailed proof of this theorem appears in Appendix 6. As the stage 2 oligopolis-
tic pricing equilibrium converges to marginal cost pricing when the market becomes
increasingly transparent, our main challenge there is to show that the marginal im-
pact of transparency on consumer surplus in a given oligopoly is bounded and that
limφ→1− dCSKφ /dφ exists for 2 ≤ K ≤ N .
5.3 The special case of constant demand functions
For demand functions that satisfy neither of the two conditions in the theorem, i.e., for
those such that CSm = 0 and CS(0) = Rm, the marginal impact of market transparency
13Note that this condition eliminates the need for the infimum operators in (2) and (3).
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on social welfare dW/dφ converges to 0 as φ→ 1−, rather than to a negative value (see
equation (29) in the Appendix). The only demand functions permitted in the current
analysis that satisfy both CSm = 0 and CS(0) = Rm are constant demand functions of
the type14
(10) D(p) =
{
a if p ∈ [0, pm]
0 if p > pm
,
where pm, a > 0.
Indeed, for demand functions such as (10), there exists a tractable representation
of social welfare and one can verify that market transparency is unambiguously welfare
improving for all φ ∈ (0, 1) and that the marginal effect goes to zero as φ → 1−.
Therefore, using a constant demand function leads to a qualitatively different and, more
importantly, exceptional welfare result compared to using a more general price dependent
demand schedule.
For example, in a model of product differentiation with a unit demand function (i.e.,
a = 1), Schultz (2009) investigates the case of an ‘almost homogeneous market’ by taking
the limit of transportation cost to zero. The rest of the setup is comparable to ours.
It is found that social welfare always increases in market transparency. However, we
have just learned that this finding cannot be generalized to any other more general price
dependent demand function.
5.4 Optimal transparency
Our theorem implies that for almost all demand functions, full transparency is socially
excessive. However, it is silent on the exact level of optimal market transparency. In this
section, we present an example to gain further understanding on optimal transparency
in the current framework. We demonstrate that the negative market structure effect can
be quite pronounced and that the optimal market transparency can be quite low.
Example. Consider a market with a simple linear demand function, D(p) = 1 − p for
p ∈ [0, 1]. The monopoly revenue Rm is hence 1/4. Let there be two potential entrants,
i.e., N = 2. We further consider two cases.
First, let f = 1/10. When φ > 1/5, the symmetric entry is in mixed strategies and
our theorem applies.15 When φ ≤ 1/5, both firms can enter without incurring losses.
With both firms entering the market with certainty, the market structure effect is absent
and market transparency increases social welfare through its positive competition effect.
Figure 1(a) represents social welfare W as a function of market transparency φ. We
note that market transparency increases social welfare even after the market structure
14As we assume neither continuity nor differentiability of a demand function for p > pm, it
is theoretically possible to have D(p) > 0 for some p > pm while still having CSm = 0. Such
trivial cases are not sufficiently interesting.
15See the discussion after condition (1) in section 2.2.
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effect becomes present (φ = 0.2). It, however, eventually decreases social welfare and
the optimal level of transparency seems quite low in this particular case.
Second, let f = 1/5 instead. Now condition (1) holds and both the positive competi-
tion effect and the negative market structure effect are present for all φ ∈ (0, 1). Figure
1(b) represents social welfare W for f = 1/5. Although the pattern is similar to the
previous case, we note that social welfare and the optimal level of market transparency
are much lower in this case.16
φ
W
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.056
0.112
0.168
0.224
0.280
(a) Low entry cost: f = 1/10
φ
W
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
(b) High entry cost: f = 1/5
Figure 1
Social welfare (W ) as a function of market transparency (φ)
6 Concluding remarks
Except for Section 5 in Schultz (2009), papers on welfare consequences of market trans-
parency have largely focused on (asymmetric) long run free entry of firms. Our paper
complements the existing literature by providing an account for the case of simultaneous
entry.
This half of the picture revealed by the current paper is rather striking given that
absent collusion all previous papers find consumer side market transparency universally
welfare improving. Indeed, we find that except for the set of constant demand functions,
market transparency eventually becomes socially excessive as transparency keeps on
rising.
We attribute this surprising negative result to the previously overlooked market struc-
ture effect of market transparency: when firms enter with lower probabilities, the market
16Numerical simulations for this example indicate a negative relationship between entry cost
and the optimal level of transparency.
17
is more likely to break down and price competition is less likely. In the special case of a
constant demand function, however, this market structure effect is inconsequential. This
explains the qualitative difference in welfare results between a model with a general price
dependent demand function and one with, say, a unit demand function.
Finally, compared to Schultz (2009) and Gu and Wenzel (2011), we would like to note
that it is the market structure effect of transparency and not the assumption of product
homogeneity that accounts for the current result. In a symmetric entry equilibrium, as
long as it does not pay for all potential entrants to enter a fully transparent market,
this negative market structure effect of market transparency is present, with or without
product differentiation. Of course, product differentiation affects the optimal level of
market transparency which we do not know much about from the current analysis. We
hope that future research will shed more light on this issue.
Appendix: Proof of the theorem
The plan of this proof is as follows. After some preliminary results, we first investi-
gate the competition effect of market transparency as the market becomes increasingly
transparent, i.e., the marginal impact of φ on CSKφ in any K-firm oligopoly, as φ→ 1.17
Subsequently, we examine the market structure effect in the limit by evaluating the
marginal impact of φ on the entry probability ε. Finally, we combine these two effects
to show that the total marginal effect of φ on ex ante expected welfare W is negative in
the limit as φ→ 1 if either (or both) of the two conditions in the theorem is met.
A.1 Preliminaries
Consider a K-firm oligopoly with intermediate transparency φ ∈ (0, 1). By Assump-
tion (D), R(p) strictly increases in p on (0, pm). Consequently, the equilibrium pricing
strategy (3) for p ∈ [p, pm] reduces to
(11) HK(p) = 1−
(
1− φ
Kφ
Rm −R(p)
R(p)
) 1
K−1
.
The corresponding density function is thus
(12) hK(p) =
1− φ
K(K − 1)φ
(
1− φ
Kφ
Rm −R(p)
R(p)
) 2−K
K−1 RmR′(p)
R2(p)
.
From (11) and (12), we can derive the distribution of the minimum price among the
K entrants and its density, respectively,
HK(1)(p) = 1−
(
1−HK(p))K ,
hK(1)(p) = K
(
1−HK(p))K−1 hK(p).
17For conciseness, we write φ→ 1 instead of φ→ 1− in this appendix.
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To determine consumer surplus further below, we combine the above two distribu-
tions, weighing them with the share of informed and uninformed consumers, respectively.
The corresponding density and its derivative regarding φ read
h
K
(p) := φhK(1)(p) + (1− φ)hK(p)
=
(1− φ)2
K(K − 1)φ
(Rm)2R′(p)
R3(p)
(
1− φ
Kφ
Rm −R(p)
R(p)
) 2−K
K−1
=
(1− φ)Rm
R(p)
hK(p)(13)
and
(14)
dh
K
(p)
dφ
= − (K − 1)φ+ 1
(K − 1)φ(1− φ)h
K
(p).
From (2), the lowest price pK in the support is implicitly defined by
R
(
pK
)
=
1− φ
(K − 1)φ+ 1R
m.
Using total differentiation,
(15)
dpK
dφ
= − K
[(K − 1)φ+ 1]2
Rm
R′
(
pK
) .
Finally, we evaluate the combined density h
K
(p) at this lower bound of price pK :
(16) h
K (
pK
)
=
[(K − 1)φ+ 1]3
K(K − 1)φ(1− φ)
R′
(
pK
)
Rm
.
A.2 Competition effect: consumer surplus in a K-firm oligopoly
When 2 ≤ K ≤ N firms have entered the market, consumer surplus is given by (4).
Using the combined density h
K
(p),18
CSKφ =
∫ pm
p(φ)
CS(p)h(p)dp.
The marginal impact of φ on CSKφ is thus given by
dCSKφ
dφ
= −CS (p(φ))h (p(φ)) dp
dφ
+
∫ pm
p(φ)
CS(p)
dh(p)
dφ
dp
18We write p(φ) to highlight p’s dependence on φ. Note that for conciseness the index K
associated with pK and h
K
(p) has been suppressed.
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= CS
(
p(φ)
) (K − 1)φ+ 1
(K − 1)φ(1− φ) −
(K − 1)φ+ 1
(K − 1)φ(1− φ)CS
K
φ
=
(K − 1)φ+ 1
(K − 1)φ
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CSKφ
1− φ ,(17)
where the second equality is obtained by substituting (16) for h
(
p(φ)
)
, (15) for dp/dφ
and (14) for dh(p)/dφ.
When φ → 1, p converges to 0 and the symmetric pricing equilibrium HK(p) con-
verges to a degenerated distribution on the constant 0. Therefore, both CS
(
p(φ)
)
and
CSKφ converge to CS(0), and it is not clear whether limφ→1 (CS
(
p(φ)
)− CSKφ )/(1− φ)
exists or not. Since directly applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule does not help, we decompose the
second part in (17) into two terms:
(18)
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CSKφ
1− φ =
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CS(0)
1− φ +
CS(0)− CSKφ
1− φ .
We now show that the limits of these two terms exist as φ → 1. For the first term,
we have
lim
φ→1
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CS(0)
1− φ = limφ→1
(
D
(
p(φ)
) dp(φ)
dφ
)
= lim
φ→1
(
D
(
p (φ)
) −K
[(K − 1)φ+ 1]2
Rm
R′
(
pK
))
=
(
lim
φ→1
−KRm
[(K − 1)φ+ 1]2
)(
lim
φ→1
D
(
p (φ)
)
D
(
p (φ)
)
+ p (φ)D′
(
p (φ)
))
=− R
m
K
,(19)
where the first equality follows from applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule and the second from equa-
tion (15). The last equation holds because by Assumption (D) the second limit is 1.
To evaluate the second term, we first divide it by Rm:
CS(0)− CSKφ
(1− φ)Rm =
1
(1− φ)Rm
∫ pm
p(φ)
(∫ p
0
D (p˜) dp˜
)
h (p) dp
=
∫ pm
p(φ)
(∫ p
0
D (p˜) dp˜
)
R (p)
h (p) dp =
∫ pm
p(φ)
Ψ (p)h (p) dp,(20)
where the second equality follows from equation (13) and the third from setting Ψ(p) :=
(
∫ p
0
D (p˜) dp˜)/R(p) for any price p ∈ (0, pm].
We note that by l’Hoˆpital’s rule and Assumption (D),
lim
p→0
Ψ(p) = lim
p→0
D(p)
D(p) + pD′(p)
= 1.
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Hence, Ψ(p) is bounded and continuous on (0, pm], the support of H(p). Now, because
the last expression in (20) represents the expected value of Ψ(p) under the probability
distribution H(p) which converges in probability to the constant p = 0, by the Port-
manteau Theorem19 we obtain
(21) lim
φ→1
CS(0)− CSKφ
(1− φ)Rm = limφ→1
∫ pm
p(φ)
Ψ(p)h(p)dp = 1.
Combining (19) and (21), we obtain the limit of (18) as φ→ 1,
lim
φ→1
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CSKφ
1− φ = limφ→1
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CS(0)
1− φ + limφ→1
CS(0)− CSKφ
1− φ
=
K − 1
K
Rm.(22)
Finally, from (17) and (22), we have
(23) lim
φ→1
dCSKφ
dφ
= lim
φ→1
(K − 1)φ+ 1
(K − 1)φ
CS
(
p(φ)
)− CSKφ
1− φ = R
m.
We note that this positive marginal impact of market transparency converges to the
monopoly revenue as the market becomes increasingly transparent and is independent
of the number of entrants K.
A.3 Market structure effect: probability of entry
The equilibrium probability of entry ε is implicitly given by (6). From equations (7),
(8) and the implicit function theorem, the marginal impact of market transparency on
equilibrium entry probability is
dε
dφ
=
−ε
(
1−Nε (1− ε)N−1 − (1− ε)N
)
(1− φ)
[
1−Nε (1− ε)N−1 − (1− ε)N
]
+ φN(N − 1)ε2 (1− ε)N−2
.
This expression is clearly negative. Moreover, in the limit as φ→ 1, we have
(24) lim
φ→1
dε
dφ
= −1−Nεˆ (1− εˆ)
N−1 − (1− εˆ)N
N(N − 1)εˆ (1− εˆ)N−2 ,
where εˆ denotes the entry probability when φ→ 1, i.e.,
(25) εˆ = 1−
(
f
Rm
) 1
N−1
.
We note that εˆ ∈ (0, 1) as f ∈ (Rm/N,Rm).
19See, e.g., Chapter 1 in Billingsley (1999).
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A.4 Ex ante expected welfare
We are now ready to evaluate the overall impact of market transparency on ex ante
social welfare as φ→ 1. By (9), we have
dW
dφ
=
∂W
∂ε
dε
dφ︸ ︷︷ ︸
The market structure effect
+
∂W
∂φ︸︷︷︸
The competition effect
=
[
N(1−Nε)(1− ε)N−2CSm] dε
dφ
+
(
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
(K −Nε)εK−1(1− ε)N−K−1CSKφ
)
dε
dφ
+
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
εK(1− ε)N−K dCS
K
φ
dφ
.(26)
We note that as φ → 1, all expressions that depend on φ converge. The reasons
are as follows. Firstly, CSKφ approaches CS(0) for all 2 ≤ K ≤ N . Secondly, by (23),
dCSKφ /dφ converges to R
m for all 2 ≤ K ≤ N . Thirdly, equilibrium probability of entry
converges to εˆ. Finally, by (24), limφ→1 dε/dφ exists. Hence, we can take the limit of
(26) as φ→ 1 to obtain
lim
φ→1
dW
dφ
=
[
N(1−Nεˆ)(1− εˆ)N−2CSm](lim
φ→1
dε
dφ
)
+
[
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
(K −Nεˆ)εˆK−1(1− εˆ)N−K−1CS(0)
](
lim
φ→1
dε
dφ
)
+
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
εˆK(1− εˆ)N−KRm.(27)
To simplify the expression in the second set of square brackets, we make use of the
following two identities:
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
KεK−1(1− ε)N−K−1 = N
1− ε
[
1− (1− ε)N−1] and
N
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
εK(1− ε)N−K−1 = N
1− ε
[
1−Nε(1− ε)N−1 − (1− ε)N] .
Together they imply
N∑
K=2
(
N
K
)
(K −Nε)εK−1(1− ε)N−K−1
=
N
1− ε
[
1− (1− ε)N−1
]
− N
1− ε
[
1− (1− ε)N −Nε (1− ε)N−1
]
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=N(N − 1)ε(1− ε)N−2.(28)
Using (24), (25) and (28), (27) can be reduced to
lim
φ→1
dW
dφ
=
[
N(1−Nεˆ)(1− εˆ)N−2CSm](1−Nεˆ(1− εˆ)N−1 − (1− εˆ)N−N(N − 1)εˆ(1− εˆ)N−2
)
[
N(N − 1)εˆ(1− εˆ)N−2CS(0)](1−Nεˆ(1− εˆ)N−1 − (1− εˆ)N−N(N − 1)εˆ(1− εˆ)N−2
)
+Rm
[
1−Nεˆ(1− εˆ)N−1 − (1− εˆ)N]
=−
(
1−Nεˆ(1− εˆ)N−1 − (1− εˆ)N
N − 1
)
1− εˆ
εˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
CSm︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−
[
1−Nεˆ (1− εˆ)N−1 − (1− εˆ)N
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(CS(0)− CSm −Rm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
.(29)
Thus, if CSm > 0, or CS(0)− CSm −Rm > 0, or both, limφ→1 dW/dφ < 0. Q.E.D.
References
Albaek, S., P. Møllgaard, and P. B. Overgaard (1997), “Government-assisted oligopoly coor-
dination? A concrete case,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(4), 429–43.
Armstrong, M., J. Vickers, and J. Zhou (2009), “Prominence and consumer search,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 40(2), 209–233.
Billingsley, P. (1999), Convergence of Probability Measures, 2nd ed., Wiley Series in Probability
and Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Boone, J., and J. Potters (2006), “Transparency and prices with imperfect substitutes,” Eco-
nomics Letters, 93(3), 398 – 404.
Carlin, B. I. (2009), “Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets,” Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 91(3), 278–287.
David, H., and H. Nagaraja (2003), Order Statistics, 3rd ed., Wiley and Sons, Hoboken.
Diamond, P. A. (1971), “A model of price adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 3(2),
156–168.
Dixit, A., and C. Shapiro (1986), “Entry dynamics with mixed strategies,” in: L. Thomas III
(ed.), The Economics of Strategic Planning: Essays in Honor of Joel Dean, Lexington Books,
Lexington, MA, pp. 63–79.
Ellison, G., and S. F. Ellison (2009), “Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the Inter-
net,” Econometrica, 77(2), 427–452.
Etro, F. (2006), “Aggressive leaders,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(1), 146–154.
Etro, F. (2008), “Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry,” Economic Journal,
118(532), 1670–1697.
Etro, F. (2011a), “Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-
agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying,” European Economic Review, 55(4), 463 –
479.
23
Etro, F. (2011b), “Endogenous market structures and strategic trade policy,” International
Economic Review, 52(1), 63–84.
Gu, Y., and T. Wenzel (2009), “A note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with
elastic demand,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(5), 567–571.
Gu, Y., and T. Wenzel (2011), “Transparency, price-dependent demand and product variety,”
Economics Letters, 110(3), 216–219.
Gu, Y., and T. Wenzel (2012a), “Price-dependent demand in spatial models,” B. E. Journal
of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12(1), Article 6.
Gu, Y., and T. Wenzel (2012b), “Transparency, entry, and productivity,” Economics Letters,
115(1), 7–10.
Hehenkamp, B. (2002), “Sluggish consumers: An evolutionary solution to the Bertrand para-
dox,” Games and Economic Behavior, 40(1), 44–76.
Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39(153), 41–57.
Hviid, M., and H. P. Møllgaard (2006), “Countervailing power and price transparency,” Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 108(3), 499–512.
Janssen, M. C. W., and J. L. Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004), “Strategic pricing, consumer search
and the number of firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 71(4), 1089–1118.
Jewell, R., and V. Harbin (1982), The RKO Story, Arlington House, New York.
Møllgaard, H. P., and P. B. Overgaard (2001), “Market transparency and competition policy,”
Rivista di Politica Economica, 91(4), 11–64.
Osborne, M. (2009), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
Rosenthal, R. W. (1980), “A model in which an increase in the number of sellers leads to a
higher price,” Econometrica, 48(6), 1575–1579.
Salop, S. (1979), “Monopolistic competition with outside goods,” Bell Journal of Economics,
10(1), 141–156.
Schultz, C. (2004), “Market transparency and product differentiation,” Economics Letters,
83(2), 173–178.
Schultz, C. (2005), “Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 49(2), 279–297.
Schultz, C. (2009), “Transparency and product variety,” Economics Letters, 102(3), 165–168.
Shaked, M., and J. G. Shanthikumar (2007), Stochastic Orders, Springer, New York.
Stahl, D. O. (1989), “Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 79(4), 700–712.
Varian, H. R. (1980), “A model of sales,” American Economic Review, 70(4), 651–659.
Yiquan Gu
Management School
University of Liverpool
Chatham Street
Liverpool, L69 7ZH
United Kingdom
yiquan.gu@liv.ac.uk
Burkhard Hehenkamp
Faculty of Business Administration
and Economics
Chair of Institutional Economics and
Economic Policy
University of Paderborn
Warburger Str. 100
33089 Paderborn
Germany
burkhard.hehenkamp@wiwi.upb.de
